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AT THE INTERFACE:
DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS




This paper considers how implicit and explicit knowledge are disso-
ciable but cooperative. It reviews various psychological and neuro-
biological processes by which explicit knowledge of form-meaning
associations impacts upon implicit language learning. The interface
is dynamic: It happens transiently during conscious processing, but
the influence upon implicit cognition endures thereafter. The primary
conscious involvement in SLA is the explicit learning involved in the
initial registration of pattern recognizers for constructions that are then
tuned and integrated into the system by implicit learning during sub-
sequent input processing. Neural systems in the prefrontal cortex
involved in working memory provide attentional selection, perceptual
integration, and the unification of consciousness. Neural systems in
the hippocampus then bind these disparate cortical representations
into unitary episodic representations. These are the mechanisms by
which Schmidt’s (1990) noticing helps solve Quine’s (1960) problem
of referential indeterminacy. Explicit memories can also guide the con-
scious building of novel linguistic utterances through processes of
analogy. Formulas, slot-and-frame patterns, drills, and declarative
pedagogical grammar rules all contribute to the conscious creation
of utterances whose subsequent usage promotes implicit learning
and proceduralization. Flawed output can prompt focused feedback
by way of recasts that present learners with psycholinguistic data
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ready for explicit analysis. Other processes of acquisition from out-
put include differentiation, analysis, and preemption. These pro-
cesses of conscious construction in working memory underpin
relationships between individual differences in working memory
capacities and language learning aptitude.
1. HOW DOES EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE AFFECT IMPLICIT
LANGUAGE LEARNING?
The more novelty we encounter, the more conscious involvement is needed
for successful learning and problem-solving+ ~Baars, 1997b!
We learn language while using language+ When things go right, when rou-
tine communication flows easily, this time on task tunes our skills without us
giving much thought to the learning process+ When things go wrong, when
communication breaks down, we try hard to negotiate meaning, and we learn
a lot about linguistic construction in the process+ Implicit learning of lan-
guage occurs during fluent comprehension and production+ Explicit learning
of language occurs in our conscious efforts to negotiate meaning and con-
struct communication+
Cognitive linguistic and functional theories of language contend that the
basic units of language representation are constructions+ These are form-
function mappings, conventionalized in the speech community and entrenched
as language knowledge in the learner’s mind+ Constructions are symbolic: They
specify the defining properties of morphological, syntactic, and lexical form
and the semantic, pragmatic, and discourse functions that are associated with
it+ Usage-based theories of language acquisition hold that we learn construc-
tions while using language, of engaging in communication, and that an indi-
vidual’s linguistic competence emerges from the memories of the utterances
in their history of language use and the abstraction of regularities within them+
The following reviews provide overviews of the foundation fields of cognitive
linguistics and usage-based models of acquisition: Barlow & Kemmer, 2000;
Bates & MacWhinney, 1981; Bod, Hay, & Jannedy, 2003; Bybee & Hopper, 2001;
Croft & Cruise, 2004; N+ Ellis, 2003; Goldberg, 1995; Jurafsky, 2002; Jurafsky &
Martin, 2000; Langacker, 1987; Robinson & Ellis, in press; Taylor, 2002; Toma-
sello, 1998, 2003+
As I have argued before in these pages ~N+ Ellis, 2002a!, the bulk of lan-
guage acquisition is implicit learning from usage+Most knowledge is tacit knowl-
edge; most learning is implicit; the vast majority of our cognitive processing
is unconscious+ Implicit learning supplies a distributional analysis of the prob-
lem space: Frequency of usage determines availability of representation accord-
ing to the power law of learning, and this process tallies the likelihoods of
occurrence of constructions and the relative probabilities of their mappings
between aspects of form and interpretations, with generalizations arising from
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conspiracies of memorized utterances collaborating in productive schematic
linguistic constructions ~Bybee & Hopper, 2001; N+ Ellis, 2002a; Elman et al+,
1996; Langacker, 1987;MacWhinney, 1987b, 1999; Saffran, 2001; Tomasello, 1998,
2003!+ Implicit learning also forges serial associations, synthesizing colloca-
tions, larger formulas, and composite constructions by chunking together con-
tiguous components, thus creating hierarchical organizational structures
~N+ Ellis, 1996; Reber, 1993; Stadler & Frensch, 1998!+ Once associated, the com-
ponents stimulate each other, via these connections, in the spreading activa-
tion of the cognitive unconscious+ Related exemplars thus work together in
implicit memory, their likenesses harmonizing into an attractor state, and it
is by these means that linguistic prototypes and categories emerge+ These are
the aspects of language acquisition that are readily simulated in connection-
ist models ~Christiansen & Chater, 2001!+ Implicit learning, operating through-
out primary and secondary neocortical sensory and motor areas, collates the
evidence of language, and the results of this tallying provide an optimal solu-
tion to the problem space of form-function mappings and their contextualized
use+ The representational systems modularize over thousands of hours on task+
In these ways, unconscious learning processes, which occur automatically dur-
ing language usage, are necessary in developing the rationality of fluency
~N+ Ellis, submitted; Jurafsky, 1996; MacWhinney, 1987b; Seidenberg & Mac-
Donald, 1999; Shanks, 1995!+ Nevertheless, these incidentals are not suffi-
cient+ Many aspects of a second language are unlearnable—or at best are
acquired very slowly—from implicit processes alone ~N+ Ellis, 1994b; 2002b;
in press; submitted!+
Krashen ~1985! was correct to the extent that, as he termed it, acquisition
and learning are different things; in psychological vernacular, explicit and
implicit knowledge are distinct and dissociated; they involve different types
of representation and are substantiated in separate parts of the brain ~N+ Ellis,
1994c, 1996; Schacter, 1987; Squire & Kandel, 1999!+ Paradis ~1994! was cor-
rect in stating that explicit knowledge does not become implicit knowledge,
nor can it be converted to it+ Nevertheless, there is interaction+ However unalike
they are, these two types of knowledge interact+ The interface question, at
the very foundations of SLA, applied linguistics, and child language acquisi-
tion, has motivated a wide range of empirical research over the last 30 years,
and the weight of the subsequent findings demonstrates that language acqui-
sition can be speeded by explicit instruction+ Reviews of the experimental and
quasi-experimental investigations into the effectiveness of second language
~L2! instruction ~e+g+, Doughty & Williams, 1998; Ellis & Laporte, 1997; Hulstijn
& DeKeyser, 1997; Lightbown, Spada, & White, 1993; Long, 1983a; Spada, 1997!,
particularly the comprehensive meta-analysis of Norris and Ortega ~2000!, dem-
onstrate that focused L2 instruction results in substantial target-oriented gains,
that explicit types of instruction are more effective than implicit types, and
that the effectiveness of L2 instruction is durable+
Learning is a dynamic process; it takes place during processing, as Hebb
~1949!, Craik and Lockhart ~1972!, Pienemann ~1998!, and O’Grady ~2003! have
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all reminded us from their different domains+ In fluency, both language pro-
cessing and language tallying ~N+ Ellis, 2002a! are typically unconscious; our
implicit systems automatically process the input, allowing our conscious selves
to concentrate on the meaning rather than the form+ These implicit, habitual
processes are highly adaptive in predictable situations+ However, as with other
implicit modules, when automatic capabilities fail, there follows a call recruit-
ing additional collaborative conscious support ~Baars & Franklin, 2003!: We
only think about walking when we stumble, about driving when a child runs
into the road, and about language when communication breaks down+ In unpre-
dictable conditions, the capacity of consciousness to organize existing knowl-
edge in new ways is indispensable+ “The particulars of the distribution of
consciousness, so far as we know them, point to them being efficacious+ + +”
~James, 1950!+ This paper reviews various psychological processes of inter-
face+ They share the common property that interface is a dynamic process; it
happens in conscious processing+
Section 2 contextualizes this analysis within current cognitive and neuro-
scientific studies of consciousness+ Research concerning the neural corre-
lates of consciousness ~NCC!, consciousness and binding, and the ways in
which consciousness creates global access informs our concerns regarding
the neurobiology of implicit tallying and how this differs from explicit process-
ing, the neural processes underlying conscious thought, and the role of con-
scious cognition in learning+ Having considered the general relations between
consciousness and cognition, the article then concentrates on consciousness
and language learning+
Section 3 describes how the primary mechanism of explicit language learn-
ing is the initial registration of pattern recognizers for constructions that are
then tuned and integrated into the system by implicit learning during sub-
sequent input processing+ Neural systems in the prefrontal cortex involved
in working memory, in the thalamus, and in the parietal cortex resonate in a
neuronal synchrony required for perceptual integration and binding, buildup
of coherent representations, attentional selection, awareness, and the unifi-
cation of consciousness+ Explicit learning results in explicit memories+ Neu-
ral systems in the hippocampus bind disparate cortical representations into
unitary episodic representations+ These are the mechanisms by which
Schmidt’s ~1990! noticing helps to solve Quine’s ~1960! problem of referential
indeterminacy+
Section 4 considers a range of additional routes of interface+ Explicit mem-
ories are also used in the conscious building of novel linguistic utterances+
Formulas are used analogically in the production of novel constructions+ Slot-
and-frame patterns, drills, mnemonics, and declarative statements of pedagog-
ical grammar likewise all contribute to the conscious creation of utterances
that then partake in subsequent implicit learning and proceduralization+ Flawed
output can also prompt focused feedback by way of recasts that present learn-
ers with psycholinguistic data ready for explicit analysis+ Other processes of
acquisition from output include differentiation, analysis, and preemption:Whole
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formulas, originally explicitly learned as phonological wholes, can later be
dissected into their component structural parts+ Conscious rehearsal in the
phonological loop can provide data that evidences noncontiguous associa-
tions, discontinuous dependencies that—although out of the scope of implicit
learning—can nevertheless be scrutinized and conjoined+ Memorized expres-
sions can provide negative evidence, constraining the hypothesis space from
overly general grammars+ Section 5 considers how these conscious opera-
tions take place in working memory and the ways in which individual differ-
ences in working memory capacities might thus determine language learning
aptitude+
2. THE NEUROBIOLOGICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSCIOUS
AND UNCONSCIOUS LEARNING
The interface question has driven research in applied linguistics and SLA for
the last 20 years ~Bialystok, 1982; Krashen, 1985; McLaughlin, 1987! while psy-
chological research was independently investigating the dissociations between
implicit and explicit memory ~Schacter, 1987! and between implicit and explicit
learning ~Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980!+ Ten years later, researchers
on the boundary of applied linguistics and psychology pulled together these
separate bodies of research ~N+ Ellis, 1994a; Paradis, 1994; Schmidt, 1990!+ The
clear evidence of the dissociability of implicit and explicit knowledge systems
led these analyses to focus upon the separability of implicit and explicit lan-
guage learning and of implicit and explicit language knowledge, with some
reviews concentrating on the contributions of implicit learning to SLA ~N+ Ellis,
2002a, in press; Krashen, 1985, 1994! and others concentrating on those of
explicit learning to SLA ~N+ Ellis, 1995a; Lightbown et al+, 1993; Long, 1991;
Schmidt, 1993!+ However, applied linguistic analyses suggest some interface
between explicit and implicit learning, if only a weak one ~Doughty & Wil-
liams, 1998; R+ Ellis, 1994, 2001; Long, 1991; Norris & Ortega, 2000; Spada, 1997!+
What is the nature of this weak interface? How can we understand it in cogni-
tive and neurobiological terms? The goal of this paper is to outline a range of
possible mechanisms, building upon prior proposals in terms of cognitive analy-
ses of attention in SLA ~N+ Ellis, 2002b; Robinson, 2003; Schmidt, 2001!, focus
on form ~Doughty, 2001!, input processing ~Gass, 1997; VanPatten, 1996, 2002!,
skill theory and output practice ~DeKeyser, 2001; DeKeyser & Sokalski, 1996!
and combinations thereof ~N+ Ellis, 2002b; R+ Ellis, 1994; MacWhinney, 1997;
Robinson, 2001; Terrell, 1991!, and to begin to relate these to current neuro-
scientific analyses of consciousness and language+
The last 10 years have seen significant advances in our understanding of
consciousness and its roles in learning and memory+ There have been three
main developments to the Scientific Study of Consciousness ~Baars, Banks, &
Newman, 2003!1 : ~a! cognitive neuroscientific investigation of the neural cor-
relates of consciousness ~NCC; see Koch, 2004, for review!, ~b! cognitive analy-
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sis of consciousness ~particularly Global Workspace Theory; Baars, 1988,
1997b!, and ~c! computational modeling of the events underlying the emer-
gence of self-amplifying resonances across a global network of neuronal coali-
tions, the dynamic competition among the massively parallel constituency of
the unconscious mind that elects ~Koch, pp+ 24, 173! the current oneness of
the fleeting stream of conscious experience ~Dehaene & Changeux, 2004;
Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003!+ It is time to bring this research to bear
upon SLA+ These developments inform three issues here: the neurobiology of
implicit tallying, the neural correlates of consciousness, and the role of con-
sciousness in learning+
The Neurobiology of Implicit Tallying
The wealth of cognitive and psycholinguistic evidence for the role of implicit
tallying, priming, and strengthening in language learning ~N+ Ellis, 2002a! has
recently been supported by neurobiological research that identifies brain areas
involved in learning from unconscious processing+
A visual word that is flashed for only a few tens of milliseconds remains
readable+ However, when the same word is presented in close spatial and tem-
poral proximity with other visual stimuli, it becomes invisible and unnoticed,
a phenomenon called masking+ Behavioral evidence indicates that the visual,
orthographic, and phonological properties of masked words—and even their
meaning—can be extracted under masking conditions that do not elicit con-
sciousness of those processing steps+ This suggests that masked words can
unconsciously activate part of the cerebral networks for word processing+
Dehaene et al+ ~2001! used functional magnetic resonance imaging ~fMRI! and
event-related potentials ~ERPs! to visualize the cerebral processing of unseen
masked words+ They showed that these unnoticed masked words activated
extrastriate, fusiform, and precentral regions of the brain and that this activ-
ity caused significant priming, as indexed by a reduction in response time and
in brain activity to subsequent conscious words+ However, these masked words
failed to elicit the correlated and distributed pattern of additional activation
of prefrontal and parietal areas observed when the same words are con-
sciously perceived+ The degree of parietal and prefrontal activity was a good
index of conscious perception in that it correlated with participants’ ability
to report the masked words+
Thus, words that are visually presented under masking conditions ~so as
to be below the threshold for noticing! are nevertheless processed in primary
perceptual areas such as the ventral occipito-temporal cortex and are thereby
and therein primed and tallied, even though this activity is not sufficient to
support conscious vision without an additional contribution from parietal and
prefrontal areas ~see also Koch, 2004; Rees, 2001a, 2001b; Rees, Kreiman, &
Koch, 2002!+
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This work also speaks to the relationship between consciousness and atten-
tion+ Although noticing is not necessary for priming and tallying, attention is+
Naccache, Blandin, and Dehaene ~2002! showed that unconscious word prim-
ing occurred only if subjects attended to the stimulus; without attention, no
priming took place+ It seems, therefore, that the correct characterization is
not that we are passive learners, with everything in our stimulus environment
being tallied+ Nor are we restricted to being conscious learners, with only that
which is focally attended and of which we are aware being the totality of what
is learned+ It is something in between these two extremes: There is implicit
associative learning that results from stimuli that are attended and automati-
cally processed following preestablished task-relevant routines, even though
this level of attention might not be sufficient for awareness, for seeing the
stimulus+
The NCC
More usually, without masking, with processing driven by longer presenta-
tions or more salient stimuli or volitional attention, there is an additional surge
of activity, widespread and multifocal, involving a plethora of prefrontal, cin-
gulate, and left parietal regions ~Dehaene et al+, 2001; Kanwisher, 2001; Koch,
2004; Rees, 2001a; Rees et al+, 2002!+ The NCC involve a coalition of forebrain
neurons implicated in working memory and planning, interconnected via wide-
spread cortico-cortico and cortico-thalamic feedback loops with sets of neu-
rons in sensory and motor regions that code for particular features+ Any one
percept—real or imagined—corresponds to a winning coalition of the essen-
tial features coded by these different but related regions+ Thus, for example,
even though different areas of my brain code the heat, the liquidity, the aroma,
the sweetness, and the color of a mouthful of coffee, activation in these nodes
is simultaneously synchronized into a winning coalition that reinforces the
firing activity of its member neurons—probably by synchronizing their spik-
ing discharge—and suppresses competing ones in a winner-takes-all fashion+
Consciousness gives clout: When processes compete for ongoing control of
the body, the one with the greatest clout dominates the scene until a process
with even greater clout displaces it ~Dennett, 2001!+ At any one moment, the
winning coalition, expressed in the content of consciousness, is briefly sus-
tained for a discrete epoch of somewhere between 20 and 200 ms before it is
replaced by another coalition in the ongoing stream of snapshots of conscious-
ness+ Stabilization of the coalition seems to be achieved by massive feedback
known as reentrant signaling, perhaps involving thalamo-cortical loops, which
is synchronized in rhythmic action potential discharge in the 30- to 60-Hz
gamma band of electroencephalograph ~EEG! frequency+ There is consider-
able ongoing research into this gamma band activity, both as an index of atten-
tive awareness and as a mechanism for solving the binding problem ~Crick &
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Koch, 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 2004; Edelman, 1989; Edelman & Tononi,
2000; Koch, 2004; Singer, 1999!+
The NCC is a huge, difficult, and fascinating question, and it is generating a
correspondingly massive collaborative research effort+ A lot more will have
been discovered in another 10 years+ However, what is already known, as sum-
marized here, is potent enough in its implications for the interactions of con-
scious and implicit learning and knowledge: Implicit learning occurs largely
within modality and involves the priming or chunking of representations or
routines within a module; it is the means of tuning our zombie agents, the
menagerie of specialized sensori-motor processors that carry out routine oper-
ations in the absence of direct conscious sensation or control ~Koch, 2004,
chapter 12!+ However, conscious processing is spread wide over the brain and
unifies otherwise disparate areas in a synchronized focus of activity+ Con-
scious activity affords much more scope for focused long-range association
and influence than does implicit learning+ It brings about a whole new level of
potential associations+
Consciousness and Learning: The Collaborative Mind
Compared to the vast number of unconscious neural processes happening in
any given moment, conscious capacity evidences a very narrow bottleneck+
However, the narrow limits of consciousness have a compensating advantage:
Consciousness seems to act as a gateway, creating access to essentially any
part of the nervous system+ Consciousness creates global access ~Baars, 1997a!+
Baars ~1988, 1997a! introduced Global Workspace Theory by describing the
likenesses between our cognitive architecture and a working theater+ The entire
stage of the theater corresponds to working memory, the immediate memory
system in which we talk to ourselves, visualize places and people, and plan
actions+ In the working theater, focal consciousness acts as a bright spot on
the stage+ Conscious events hang around, monopolizing time in the limelight+
The bright spot is further surrounded by a fringe ~Mangan, 1993! or penumbra
~James, 1950; Koch, 2004, chapter 14! of associated, vaguely conscious events+
Information from the bright spot is globally distributed to the vast audience
of all of the unconscious modules we use to adapt to the world+ A theater
combines very limited events taking place on stage with a vast audience, just
as consciousness involves limited information that creates access to a vast
number of unconscious sources of knowledge+ Consciousness is the publicity
organ of the brain+ It is a facility for accessing, disseminating, and exchang-
ing information and for exercising global coordination and control: Con-
sciousness is the interface+ “Paying attention—becoming conscious of some
material—seems to be the sovereign remedy for learning anything, applicable
to many very different kinds of information+ It is the universal solvent of the
mind” ~Baars, 1997a, p+ 304!+
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Note that in this view, consciousness is not the director, neither is it the
author of the play+ The contents of consciousness are hugely constrained by
top-down processes+ However, the stream of consciousness is the reflection
of thoughts, not the thoughts themselves+ Consciousness has no more access
to the implicit workings of the prefrontal cortex and other regions involved
in the evaluation of different courses of action, decision-making, and plan-
ning than it does to the implicit workings of the lower perceptual levels of
primary perceptual cortex+ The theater in Global Workspace Theory is all of
our unconscious modules; there is no one place in the brain to which the
unconscious modules send their results for ultimate conscious appreciation
by the Audience, as in a Cartesian theater ~Dennett, 2001!+ In Freud’s ~1961!
terms, the id and the super-ego are both unconscious+ In Koch’s work ~2004,
chapter 18!, the homunculus is nonconscious+ In Jackendoff’s work ~1987!,
consciousness is an intermediate level: Thinking—the manipulation of sen-
sory data, concepts, and more abstract patterns—is largely unconscious; what
is conscious about thoughts are images, tones, silent speech, and other feel-
ings associated with intermediate-level sensory representations+ At any one
time, our state of mind reflects complex dynamic interactions of implicit and
explicit knowledge:
In the human brain information ~as a marginally coupled, phase-locked state!
is created and destroyed in the metastable regime of the coordination
dynamics, where tendencies for apartness and togetherness, individual and
collective, segregation and integration, phase synchrony and phase scat-
tering coexist+ New information is created because the system operates in
a special régime where the slightest nudge will put it into a new coordi-
nated state+ In this way, the ~essentially nonlinear! coordination dynamics
creates new, informationally meaningful coordination states that can be
stabilized over time+ The stability of information over time is guaranteed
by the coupling between component parts and processes and constitutes
a dynamic kind of ~nonhereditary! memory+ ~Scott Kelso, 2002, p+ 369!
Global Workspace Theory and parallel research into NCC illuminates the
mechanisms by which the brain interfaces functionally and anatomically inde-
pendent implicit and explicit memory systems involved variously in motoric,
auditory, emotive, or visual processing and in declarative, analogue, percep-
tual, or procedural memories, despite their different modes of processing,
which bear upon representations and entities of very different natures+ Bio-
logical adaptations tend to be accretive ~Gould, 1982!+ The speech system, for
example, is overlaid on a set of organs that in earlier mammals supports breath-
ing, eating, and simple vocalization+ Language is overlaid on systems for the
visual representation of the world+ Yet, however different the symbolic repre-
sentations of language and the analogue representations of vision are, they
interact so that through language, we create mental images in our listeners
that might normally be produced only by the memory of events as recorded
and integrated by the sensory and perceptual systems of the brain ~Jerison,
1976!+ Likewise, it might be that the global broadcasting property of the con-
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sciousness system is overlaid on earlier functions that are primarily sensori-
motor+ In his major review culminating a lifetime’s pioneering work in human
neuropsychology, Luria ~1973!, having separately analyzed the workings of the
three principal functional units of the brain ~the unit for regulating tone or
waking; the unit for obtaining, processing, and storing information; and the
unit for programming, regulating, and verifying mental activity!, emphasized
that it would be a mistake to imagine that each of these units carries out its
activity independently:
Each form of conscious activity is always a complex functional system and
takes place through the combined working of all three brain units, each of
which makes its own contribution + + + all three principal functional brain
units work concertedly, and it is only by studying their interactions when
each unit makes its own specific contribution, that an insight can be
obtained into the nature of the cerebral mechanisms of mental activity+
~pp+ 99–101, emphasis in original!
Language representation in the brain involves specialized localized mod-
ules, largely implicit in their operation, collaborating via long-range associa-
tions in dynamic coalitions of cell assemblies representing—among others—
the phonological forms of words and constructions and their sensory and
motor groundings ~Barsalou, 1999; Pulvermüller, 1999, 2003!+ How might con-
sciousness be involved in the setting up of these networks, and how might
explicit, metalinguistic, pedagogical-grammatical knowledge influence these
implicit systems?
3. WHEN SOMEBODY SAYS SOMETHING
YOU DON’T UNDERSTAND
Second Language Quinean
Consciousness is experiencing: William James called the experiencing “self,”
the knower, the “I+” It is about access, too: “That of which I am conscious is
that to which I have access, or ~to put the emphasis where it belongs!, that to
which I have access” ~Dennett, 1978, emphasis in original!+ When trying to
engage your experiencing self in this paper, despite the usual third-person
conventions of scientific writing, I am therefore going to address you directly+
So, please imagine yourself there, a nonnative speaker ~NNS!, perhaps a child
in arms or an adult tourist, gathering hedgerow fruits with your Quinean-
speaking conversation partner+ You’re trying to reach that fat blackberry that
is just out of reach when your companion whispers, “I wonder if we’ll see
some gavagai today+” Your interpretation is constrained by what you already
know that is implicitly brought to bear+ Your determining the meaning of a
new word is guided by the constructions your language processors apply in
the analysis and by your knowledge of grammatical categories and frames
~Brent, 1994; Gleitman, 1990;Maratsos, 1982; Tomasello, 2003!+ Gleitman showed
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how, for example, learners can clarify the cognitive content of a verb by attend-
ing to its argument structure, a process of syntactic bootstrapping+ In the present
case, the morphosyntactic contexts cue that there is a new noun for you to
work out+ It is a start at least+
You look up to see the autumnal sunset casting long shadows across the
field—dappled orange, brown, and green+ Leaves fall+ The dew is forming, mist-
ing the shaded hollows+ An animal hops closer to the ditch+ Mushrooms, cow-
pats, acorns, long grass, thistles + + + a rich and complex scene+ And just what
might “gavagai” be? Either your host would have to add something more con-
structive, or else you would need to be present at quite a number of such
scenes before your implicit distributional analysis systems could abstract the
correct solution without further clues or guidance+ You would need enough
scenes to show that dew, thistles, and acorns are just random noise in the
presence of this linguistic cue, that it occurs equally at any time of day, and
that it is the coney that is the most reliable corollary+ Implicit learning is like
multivariate analysis—the correlated variables will become apparent against
the background noise no matter what the number of variables, as long as you
have a large enough number of observations: It is slow because it needs a
large sample, and the greater the number of potential variables of relevance,
the larger the sample size that is required for the computation of robust esti-
mates+ However, even a whole warren of examples might not justify a definite
conclusion, as Quine ~1960! demonstrated with his famous gavagai parable—
referential indeterminacy is a fundamental problem: Single words cannot sim-
ply be paired with experiences because they confront experience in clusters+
Other things being equal, a good bet might be to translate the word as “rab-
bit+” But why not translate it as, say, “fluffy cotton tail,” or “long ears,” or
“softness,” or “undetached rabbit-part,” given that any experience that makes
the use of “rabbit” appropriate would also make that of “undetached rabbit-
part” appropriate?2 Once you figure out that a word is related to something
in the world, you need to figure out specifically how, an inductive problem
whose solution is not immediately apparent in the labeling situation+
Your search for the correct referent might be helpfully speeded by a host
of attention-focusing biases that you have already acquired as general word
learning heuristics: A tendency to believe that new words often apply to whole
objects ~the whole object constraint!, that they more likely will refer to things
for which a name is not already known ~the mutual exclusivity constraint!,
that they more often relate to things distinguished by shape or function rather
than by color or texture, and the like ~Bloom, 2000; Golinkoff, 1992; Golinkoff,
Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Markman, 1989!+ Recent
computational models provide concrete accounts of how such word learning
principles emerge in development from more general aspects of cognition,
including associative learning, attention, and rational inference—that is, from
prior knowledge of the world and the ways language usually refers to it and
from the learner’s existing repertoire of linguistic constructions ~MacWhin-
ney, 1989; Merriman, 1999; Regier, 2003!+ Language is a social construction,
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and the ways that language typically relates to the world are culturally deter-
mined+ General principles of reference thus emerge both diachronically and
ontogenetically from linguistic interaction between persons and from how
salient aspects of the world form the referential focus of our social-pragmatic
inferences+
If the sample of experiences would have to be large for distributional analy-
sis to successfully approximate an answer for gavagai, what about another
type of construction, perhaps “The gavagai cookerg+” Just what should you
make of “cookerg?” Is that a new word or not? Is it compound or not? And if
so, just what function does the affix -erg signal? With enough usage examples,
implicit learning might get there in the end, and, once acquired, it certainly
will strengthen and rationalize -erg’s place in the system, but you probably
want to understand now+ Your processor has failed, and your attention has
been drawn to the problem+ Faerch and Kasper ~1986! stressed that this is a
crucial point for acquisition: Input functions as intake to the learning of higher-
level L2 material when you experience comprehension problems that are per-
ceived as deficits in your knowledge structure rather than in the input+
Likewise, White ~1987! emphasized that it is comprehension difficulties that
provide learners with the negative feedback that she believes is necessary for
L2 acquisition+ At the point of incomprehension, your conscious resources
are brought to bear+ With luck, so too are the social resources of your inter-
locutor+ Analyses of classroom,mother-child, and native speaker ~NS!-NNS inter-
actions demonstrate how conversation partners scaffold the acquisition of
novel vocabulary and other constructions by focusing attention on percep-
tual referents or shades of meaning and their corresponding linguistic forms
~Baldwin, 1996; Chun, Day, Chenoweth, & Luppescu, 1982; R+ Ellis, 2000; Gass,
1997; Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Long, 1983b; Oli-
ver, 1995; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello & Akhtar, 2000!+ The interlocutor has
various means of making the input more comprehensible: ~a! by modifying
speech, ~b! by providing linguistic and extralinguistic context, ~c! by orienting
the communication to the “here and now,” and ~d! by modifying the inter-
actional structure of the conversation ~Long, 1987!+ We are internally pro-
voked to search for meanings, just as our language tutors are motivated to
spotlight the relevant alternatives: “Notice this,” they say in their deictic words
and actions+
Explicit Learning in the Consolidation
of Linguistic Constructions
“Look, there’s the gavagai,” they say+ “Look at it hopping through the field+ Is
that a carrot it is eating?” Or, “Yes, Tom cooked the gavagai with some tur-
nips+ The gavagai cookerg really well in a stew+” They say whatever is required
to make that referent stand out in the bright spot of focal consciousness, or
at least to provide enough illumination to shade off many of the foils and irrel-
316 Nick C. Ellis
evancies+3 In this way, the primary mechanism of explicit learning is in the
initial registration of pattern recognizers for linguistic constructions+ Con-
scious awareness is important in the initial consolidation of a unitary repre-
sentation+ Attention is required in order to bind features to form newly
integrated objects+ Attention carves out for conscious experience the correct
subset of conjunctions amid the mass of potential combinations of the fea-
tures present in the scene+ Scaffolded attention helps solve Quine’s ~1960! prob-
lem+ Conscious self- and other-cued attention allows focused binding+ These
are the mechanisms of Schmidt’s ~1984, 1990, 1993, 2001! noticing hypothesis,
which holds that the subjective experience of noticing is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the conversion of input to intake in SLA+4 And not just
for SLA:
The idea that consciousness is a gateway—something that creates access
to a vast unconscious mind—has interesting implications for understand-
ing learning+ It suggests that learning just requires us to “point” our con-
sciousness at some material we want to learn, like some giant biological
camera, and the detailed analysis and storage of the material will take place
unconsciously+ Given a conscious target, it seems as if learning occurs mag-
ically, without effort or guidance, carried out by some skilled squad of
unconscious helpers+ ~Baars, 1997a!
By noticing, Schmidt ~1994! meant the registration of the occurrence of a
stimulus event in conscious awareness and its subsequent storage in long-
term memory+ Neural systems in the prefrontal cortex involved in working
memory contribute to the apperception of the stimulus—that is, its original
registration, providing the neuronal synchrony that is required for perceptual
integration, buildup of coherent representations, attentional selection, aware-
ness, and the unification of consciousness ~Baddeley, 2000, 2002; Cleeremans,
2003; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2000;
Smith & Jonides, 1999; Treisman, 1998!+ But what about subsequent storage?
Explicit Memories of Linguistic Constructions
Working memory is required in both the initial encoding and the ultimate recall
of explicit knowledge ~for reviews, see Frackowiak et al+, 2004; Kandel, Schwartz,
& Jessell, 2000, chapter 10!+ Explicit learning typically results in explicit mem-
ories, the establishment of new conjunctions of arbitrarily different elements
bound into a unitized memory representation+ The encoding of episodic mem-
ories is mediated by two principal components: a frontal-lobe component
whose operations are strategic, organizational, and accessible to conscious-
ness and voluntary control, and a modular medial temporal or hippocampal
component whose operations are essentially automatic ~Gabrieli, 1998; Mosco-
vitch, 1992!+ Evidence for the conscious contributions of working memory in
the formation of new long-term memories include ~a! the fact that the encod-
ing of explicit memories is clearly hindered by divided attention during learn-
Explicit-Implicit Interface 317
ing ~Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-
Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996!, ~b! the fact that encoding is enhanced by
preparatory attention and voluntary orienting ~Cowan, 1997; LaBerge, 1995!,
and ~c! the existence of imaging studies using positron emission tomography
~PET! that demonstrate that deep elaborative encoding operations are asso-
ciated with activation of the left dorsolateral prefrontal region ~Kapur et al+,
1994!, that activation in this same region during memory encoding is elimi-
nated by the performance of a difficult concurrent distraction task ~Shallice
et al+, 1994!, and that the amount of frontal activation at encoding is predic-
tive of subsequent memory for the verbal material ~Wagner et al+, 1998!+ Neu-
ral systems in the hippocampus and related limbic structures allow the
consolidation of explicit memories+ The hippocampus rapidly and automati-
cally binds together disparate cortical representations into a unitary repre-
sentation that can then be recalled by partial retrieval cues at a later time+
Thus, the hippocampal system confers a sense of unity to a particular expe-
rience ~i+e+, an episodic memory!; otherwise, these experiences would remain
just a jumble of loosely connected features and facts ~Squire, 1992; Squire &
Kandel, 1999!+ By forming unitized memory representations, the hippocampal
region performs the information-processing function of forming pattern-
recognition units for new stimulus configurations and of consolidating new
bindings; these are then adopted by other brain regions in the neocortex, where
they subsequently partake in implicit tuning ~Gluck, Meeter, & Myers, 2003;
O’Reilly & Norman, 2002!+
Recent brain imaging studies support this view of complementary memory
systems in the cortex and hippocampus ~Frackowiak et al+, 2004, chapters 23
and 24!+ Hippocampal structures in the medial temporal lobes are very active
early in training, when subjects are learning about stimulus–stimulus regular-
ities and evolving new stimulus representations, but less active later in train-
ing when other brain regions ~including the striatum and basal ganglia! are using
these representations to perform on the task ~Poldrack et al+, 2001!+5 Other imag-
ing studies have also demonstrated hippocampal system activations during the
encoding of memories, with these encoding activations indexing stimulus nov-
elty, in that they are greater for stimuli seen initially rather than repeatedly
~Stern, Corkin, Gonzalez, Guimaraes, & Baker, 1996; Tulving, Kapur, Craik, Mos-
covitch, & Houle, 1994!+ Repeated memories result in activation elsewhere:
Lesion and imaging studies provide convergent evidence that implicit mem-
ory, as indexed by different forms of repetition priming, reflects process-
specific plasticity in separate neocortical regions, with visual, auditory, and
tactual priming being mediated by changes in visual, auditory, and somato-
sensory neocortices, respectively ~Gabrieli, 1998!+ Thus, repetition priming in
a given domain appears to reflect experience-induced changes in the same
neural networks that subserved initial perceptual processing in that domain,
with these changes facilitating the subsequent reprocessing of the stimuli+
The two complementary memory systems—the hippocampal system and
the neocortical sensori-motor areas—allow the coexistence of instances and
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abstractions, thus solving the two basic knowledge functions of an organism
that needs to be able to acquire both specifics ~“Where did you park your car
today?” or “What is the L2 phrase for ‘Two beers, please’?”! and generaliza-
tions ~“What’s the script for purchasing petrol at a service station?” or “How
does the L2 form a plural?”!, and they prevent the problem of catastrophic
interference suffered by purely implicit connectionist mechanisms ~McClel-
land, 1995, 1998; O’Reilly & Norman, 2002!+ The neocortex has a slow learning
rate to gradually integrate new information with existing knowledge, using over-
lapping distributed representations to extract the general statistical structure
of the environment+ In contrast, the hippocampus learns rapidly, assigning dis-
tinctive sparse representations to input patterns to encode the episodic details
of specific events while minimizing interference+
Additional support for the claim that the initial learning of a novel construc-
tion ordinarily involves focused attention on the meaning-form association and
subsequent consolidation of an explicit memory comes both from amnesic
deficit and from mnemonic success+ Deficiencies in explicit memory deny the
acquisition of novel linguistic constructions+ Anterograde amnesic patients,
who have lost the ability to form novel episodic memories as a result of dam-
age to their hippocampal system, cannot learn the meaning of new words and
are severely deficient at developing new conceptual information+ They lose
these abilities alongside the rest of their post-trauma autobiography; after their
brain damage, they cannot consolidate any memories of the episodes of their
daily lives, and these experiences are thus lost to them once they have faded
from short-term memory+ Amnesia is not a failure to notice a novel conjunc-
tion; it is a failure to consolidate an explicit memory as a result of noticing+
Devoid of the memorial advantages of noticing, amnesiacs show normal implicit
memory and tuning of their perceptual and motor systems for unitized pre-
existing memory representations but grossly slow acquisition of new asso-
ciations+ Unlike normal individuals, they are simply unable to learn novel
concepts or word meanings from a few study episodes+ And what does their
preserved implicit memory ability afford them in these regards? Not much+
Amnesic patients with hippocampal damage might eventually be able to acquire
new associations through many, many repetitions—as in the development of
a habit—or through methods that involve capitalizing on priming using pro-
gressively diminishing cues ~Parkin, 1987!+ However, in these cases, their rate
of learning is grossly slow in comparison with normal subjects, and the knowl-
edge so acquired is atypically inflexible and accessible only when exactly the
same cues are presented that were used during training ~Squire, 1992!+ Else-
where ~N+ Ellis, 1994c!, I made much of amnesiacs’ preserved implicit memory
abilities, discussing how these can tune and systematize the perceptual and
motor systems for language perception and production+ Nevertheless, the con-
clusion of present relevance is simple: Broadly speaking, no explicit memory
ability equals no ability to consolidate novel linguistic constructions+
In counterpart to the evidence from deficit, skilled explicit learning allows
accomplished vocabulary acquisition+ As Bartlett ~1932! championed, explicit
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memory is an “effort after meaning:” The more you understand something,
the better you remember it+ In their Levels of Processing framework, Craik
and Lockhart ~1972! put it that “memory trace persistence is a function of
depth of analysis, with deeper levels of analysis associated with more elab-
orate, longer lasting, and stronger traces” ~p+ 671!+ This applies equally to
memory for vocabulary+ Mnemonic techniques can be very successful in medi-
ating form-meaning vocabulary associations, with successful strategies includ-
ing keyword techniques, semantic mediation, word analysis and use of cognate
clues, inference from context, consultation of dictionaries, collocation exer-
cises, optimally spaced rehearsal practice, rich usage, and the like ~Atkinson
& Raugh, 1975; N+ Ellis, 1994c, 1995b; Ellis & Beaton, 1993; Laufer & Hulstijn,
2001; Nation, 2001; Schmitt, 2000; Stahl, 1999; Stahl & Fairbanks, 1986!+ Explicit,
deep, elaborative processing involving semantic and conceptual or imaginal
representations allows the rapid consolidation of new vocabulary and other
constructions+
Formulas: The Concrete Seeds of Abstract Trees
Explicit memories seed what will later become more schematic linguistic con-
structions+ The initial representation of a novel form-meaning conjunction usu-
ally involves consolidation of a specific, concrete explicit memory—a formula
~N+ Ellis, 1996; Pawley & Syder, 1983; Schmitt, 2004;Wray, 2002!+ The first exem-
plar is often a high-frequency expression, a salient one of prototypical mean-
ing and high functionality+ Zipf’s law applies within constructions, as it does
elsewhere throughout language and beyond ~Schooler & Anderson, 1997; Zipf,
1935!, observing that the most frequent exemplar of a construction accounts
for a disproportionately very large number of overall occurrences of that pat-
tern+ This formula is usually prototypical in its function or meaning ~Gold-
berg, 2003a, 2003b; Goldberg & Sethuraman, 1999!, and it often serves a really
useful social function too, a formulaic key to interaction and social involve-
ment ~Wong-Fillmore, 1976!+ So it is this formula that is acquired early and
thus serves as the concrete beginnings of what later will be a more general
construction schema+ Ninio ~1999! showed how individual “pathbreaking”
semantically prototypic verbs form the seeds of verb-centered argument-
structure patterns, with generalizations of the verb-centered instances emerg-
ing gradually as the verb-centered categories themselves are analyzed into
more abstract argument structure constructions+ The second formula of related
meaning is explicitly learned+ Then, the third, and perhaps another+ Also, the
database begins to provide sufficient exemplars to allow analysis ~Tomasello,
1992!: both the conscious explicit analysis of how the general construction
might work ~attentive working memory processes of hypothesis formation and
analogy, which I will deal with in Section 4! and also implicit learning ~the
neocortical processes of categorization, distributional analysis, and connec-
tionist frequency-tuned abstraction of patterns outlined in Section 1!, hence
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the usual route of naturalistic acquisition, from formula through limited scope
pattern to creative construction+
Explicit Focus on Implicit Tuning
Once a construction has been seeded in this way, with the form-meaning con-
junction consolidated as explicit memories for a few of the more high-frequency
and prototypical exemplars, thereafter there is scope for its implicit learning
on every subsequent occasion of use+ Each language processing usage results
in the elements of the construction being primed and made more available in
memory as a result: The pattern-recognition units for the aspects of language
form that are involved are incremented in strength; any subcomponent ele-
ments that are represented in the formal elements of the construction are
bound more strongly together as a result of their co-occurrence in process-
ing; the associated meaning or functional interpretation is similarly primed
by its usage; and so is the association between the formal and semantic poles+
In other words, implicit learning results in all of the elements of the construc-
tion that are activated in processing being bound more tightly together as a
whole+ Noticing is no longer necessary; mere usage in processing is enough
for this implicit tallying, priming, and strengthening to take place+ Psycholin-
guistic performance data show us to be intimately tuned to the frequencies of
form-function mappings, the default patterns that emerge, and any subpat-
terns of regularity within the mapping-space+ This distributional information
has been implicitly acquired ~N+ Ellis, 2002a! by processes that are amenable
to simulation using connectionist models ~Christiansen & Chater, 2001;
MacWhinney, 1999!+
However, one criticism of connectionist models is that it is connectionist
modelers who select what subset of the environment to represent as the input
to the model in the first place+ Illustrative of this debate within the SLA liter-
ature are the responses of Carroll ~1995, 1999! to Sokolik and Smith ~1992! and
of Gregg ~2003! to N+ Ellis ~1998; Ellis & Schmidt, 1998!+ The modelers’ motiva-
tion is pragmatic in that it is impossible to present the totality of a stimulus
environment to a computer model, and so a reasonable subset must be selected
for focus+ The linguists’ criticism is that this selection process might provide
the model with a priori solutions to the problem, as TRICS ~The Representa-
tions It Crucially Supposes! in which much of the learned solution that sup-
posedly emerges as a result of experience is actually “cryptoembodied” in the
model beforehand: For the beginnings of this debate, see the Lachter and Bever
~1988! criticism of the original Rumelhart and McClelland ~1986! past-tense
model+ This is the modern virtual parallel of the observation from the begin-
nings of SLA that although learners are surrounded by language, not all of it
goes in—Corder’s ~1967! distinction between input ~the available target lan-
guage! and intake, that subset of input that actually goes in and that the learner
utilizes in some way+ Although connectionism is successfully simulating a wide
range of patterns of implicit acquisition and processing of human language,
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thereby evidencing widespread effects of cue competition and ambiguity upon
rate and accuracy of learning ~Kempe & MacWhinney, 1998; MacWhinney,
1987b; Taraban & Roark, 1996!, there is, nevertheless, no denying the differ-
ence between the virtual and human input regimes+
A connectionist model might receive examples of past tense pairs such as:
“I type, I typed; I walk, I walked; I eat, I ate; I dance, I danced; I love, I loved,”
with regular and irregular items occurring in frequencies that represent their
actual occurrence in language corpora, and acquisition being tested with wug
tests: I &&; I &&ed+ Contrast this with the following somewhat far-fetched lan-
guage learner, motivated by romantic immersion in a study-abroad experi-
ence, as their NS partner affirms: “Yesterday, I walked alone with no purpose;
I danced not at all; I loved in vain+ Now, I don’t walk+ Now I dance, feverishly,
in full heart+ You are my love, my sustenance, my everything+ I live for this
now that I love you+” Perhaps a little hot-blooded for English as a second lan-
guage, I agree+ Nevertheless, it illustrates well enough how the selectivity of
input to connectionist models might be influential in providing some focus—a
focus on form—that contributes to the successful simulation of implicit learn-
ing from intake+ However, this success also restricts connectionism’s achieve-
ment as a complete account of SLA: In acquiring such optimality, these first
language ~L1! models go beyond the achievements of adult L2 learners, some
of whom are impervious to years of input that evidences tens of thousands of
exemplars of high-frequency form-function patterns+
What are these fragile aspects of language where input fails to become
intake, the sorts of thing with which L2 learners have difficulty? Morphology
presents major problems ~R+ Ellis, 1994!+ In the Basic Variety ~Perdue, 1993!
that characterizes the interlanguage of naturalistic L2 learners,
There is no functional morphology+ By far most lexical items correspond
to nouns, verbs and adverbs; closed-class items, in particular determin-
ers, subordinating elements, and prepositions, are rare, if present at all+ + +
Note that there is no functional inflection whatsoever: no tense, no aspect,
no mood, no agreement, no case marking, no gender assignment+ ~Klein,
1998, p+ 545!
And the reasons, I believe, are because L2 learners continue to process these
aspects of language implicitly, following the habits and tunings laid down for
the L1 ~N+ Ellis, 2002b, submitted!+ The learners are encountering novelty,
wherein—in the words used to open this article—a more conscious involve-
ment is needed for successful learning and problem-solving, yet they do not
realize it because these aspects of language are neither salient nor are they of
significant communicative value ~N+ Ellis, in press!+
Salience and Insignificance: Competition and
Multiple Cues to Meaning
The aspects of form that typically fail to become adopted and routinely used
in L2 processing are those that—however reliable as potential cues to
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interpretation—are of low salience and are redundant in the immediate under-
standing of an utterance+ One could understand how the tense markings in
the input to our far-flung learner discussed previously might get ignored in
the circumstances of the rest of the message, where there are many other
cues to the temporal reference and more important things on their mind+ More
generally, phonologically reduced tense markings are often shaded by the
brighter cues of temporal adverbs, as are inflexions for number adumbrated
by the more obvious plurality of the clear subject of the verb ~Terrell, 1991!+
In such cases, the learner’s constructions relating to tense or number do not
include these insignificant cues, and if a cue is not used in processing, then
there is no concomitant strengthening of its representational strength nor of
its association with the interpretation+
Experiments using miniature artificial languages have shown that in the ini-
tial stages of acquisition, learners tend to focus on only one cue at a time+ For
example, when cues for determining the agent in sentences include word order,
noun animacy, and agreement of noun and verb, learners typically focus atten-
tion on only one of these as the predictor of interpretation+ Later, after having
tracked the use of this first cue, they will add a second cue to the mix and
begin to use the two in combination, and, as development proceeds, so addi-
tional cues are added if they significantly helped reduce errors of understand-
ing ~Matessa & Anderson, 2000!+ This is exactly the behavior predicted by the
probabilistic contrast model ~Cheng & Holyoak, 1995!, an influential model of
rational human associative learning in situations of multiple cues and vari-
able backgrounds+ However, a language learner might never get around to notic-
ing low-salience cues, particularly when the interpretation accuracy afforded
by the other more obvious cues does well enough for everyday communica-
tive survival+ Indeed, these secondary redundant cues are subject to the asso-
ciative learning phenomenon of blocking ~Kruschke & Blair, 2000; Shanks, 1995,
chapter 2!+ It is not that they are merely ignored, but rather that they are
actively attentionally blocked ~N+ Ellis, in press!+ This is a standard associa-
tive learning effect in situations where multiple cues are learned sequentially+
In this way, low-salience cues might never become integrated into the consol-
idated construction, and, broadly, never consolidated in a first instance means
never tallied by implicit learning in usage thereafter+
Low-salience cues might be overshadowed even more in the case of L2 learn-
ers than in L1 child language learners+ Transfer of L1 experience leads them
to look elsewhere for their cues to interpretation ~James, 1980; Odlin, 1989!+ If
all the animals in your backyard live in the trees, how are you ever going to
spot the gavagai? English learners of Chinese have difficulty with tones and
Japanese learners of English have difficulty with the article system, both prob-
lems resulting from zero use in the L1+ Similarly, with case marking, word order,
agreement, and noun animacy, along with other cues, all helping to identify
the subject of a sentence to lesser or greater degree in different languages,
learners carry their L1 cue strength hierarchy across to their L2, only gradu-
ally resetting the ordering after considerable L2 experience ~MacWhinney,
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1987a!, if at all ~MacWhinney, 2001a!+ Under normal L1 circumstances, usage
optimally tunes the language system to the input; under these circumstances
of low salience of L2 form, all the extra input in the world might sum to naught,
and we describe the learner as having “fossilized” or—more correctly—
“stabilized+”
Explicit Learning: The Limelight of Consciousness, Form-Focus,
Input Processing, and Other Explanations
The remedy is to bring the issue into the light of consciousness+ In these sit-
uations, some type of explicit instruction or consciousness raising ~Sharwood
Smith, 1981! or form-focus can help the learner to notice the cue in the first
place, consolidating an explicit construction linking the cue and its interpre-
tation+ Explicit instruction can also encourage subsequent use of this cue in
processing+ Schmidt ~2001! summarized it thus: “since many features of L2
input are likely to be infrequent, non-salient, and communicatively redundant,
intentionally focused attention may be a practical ~though not theoretical!
necessity for successful language learning” ~p+ 23!+ Terrell ~1991! character-
ized explicit grammar instruction as “the use of instructional strategies to draw
the students’ attention to, or focus on, form and0or structure” ~p+ 53!, with
instruction targeted at increasing the salience of inflections and other com-
monly ignored features by first pointing them out and explaining their struc-
ture and, second, by providing meaningful input that contains many instances
of the same grammatical meaning-form relationship+ An example is Processing
Instruction ~VanPatten, 1996!, which aims to alter learners’ default processing
strategies, to change the ways in which they attend to input data, and, thus,
to maximize the amount of intake of data in L2 acquisition+ Once consolidated
into the construction, it is this new cue to interpretation of the input whose
strengths are incremented on each subsequent processing episode+ The cue
does not have to be repeatedly noticed thereafter; once consolidated, mere
use in processing for meaning is enough for implicit tallying+6 A natural corol-
lary is that if explicit knowledge is to be effective, it must be provided before
relevant input that exemplifies it ~Reber et al+, 1980! if it is to affect the pro-
cessing of the cue in question and become sufficiently associated with its
relevant interpretation to become entrenched enough to influence implicit pro-
cessing thereafter ~as with the “Rule&Instances” learners of N+ Ellis, 1993!+
Paradis ~1994, 2004! has maintained that because metalinguistic knowl-
edge and implicit language acquisition are of such different types, it is inap-
propriate to talk of their interface or to claim that metalinguistic knowledge
per se directly affects implicit linguistic competence+ Instead, he emphasized
that it is only from practice—the number of times that exemplars of a con-
struction are encountered—that implicit acquisition mechanisms tally the fre-
quency statistics that serve to establish the implicit constructions that allow
the learner, eventually, to understand and produce sentences of the given type
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automatically+ Although VanPatten ~1996! and I ~N+ Ellis, 2002a, 2002b! agree
that it is via processing that implicit mechanisms are tuned, the degree of
influence of metalinguistic information on the nature of that processing is so
profound that claims of interface and interaction seem fully justified+ As Baars
~1997a! illustrated, although you are conscious of words in your visual focus,
you definitely did not just now consciously label the word “focus” as a noun+
On reading it, you were surely unaware of its nine alternative meanings,
although in a different sentence you would instantly have brought a different
meaning to mind+ What happens to the other meanings? Psycholinguistic evi-
dence demonstrates that some of them exist unconsciously for a few tenths
of a second before your brain decides on the right one+ Most words ~over 80%
in English! have multiple meanings, but only one can become conscious at a
time+ This is a fundamental fact about consciousness and a demonstration of
the fundamental role of context on the contents of consciousness+ Read the
following:
~1! @pay# bill @speed?# sprinted @when?# crawls
@duck# bill @when?# sprinted @speed?# crawls
@had to# bill @rhyme?# sprinted @person?# crawls
In each pair, your reading of the second element was radically different as
you met it on each line+ The form was the same, but the processing was very
different in different contexts+ The @when?# context focused you in on tense,
and it was the tense aspect of present -s or past -ed that was processed and
strengthened more from those processing episodes as a result+ The @speed?#
context instead focused you in on the relevant aspects of meaning+ These rep-
resent different contexts, different interpretations, different tallying, and dif-
ferent tuning ~Baars, 1997b, chapter 5!+ Metalinguistic information can thus
provide the context that serves as a powerful constraint upon the processing
of subsequent forms, priming their conscious interpretations in these fash-
ions+ Metalinguistic information provides Scott Kelso’s ~2002! slightest nudge
that is enough to put the system into a new coordinated state+ Metalinguistic
information connects with implicit learning, and they meet and interact in pro-
cessing+ It is a dynamic interface+
Several evaluation studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of process-
ing instruction in the development of L2 comprehension and production ~Van-
Patten, 2002!+ More broadly, a meta-analysis of 25 explicit form-focused
treatments from a wide variety of studies with interventions, including con-
sciousness raising, input processing, compound focus on form, metalinguistic
task essentialness, and rule-oriented focus on form, demonstrated an average
effect size of these various treatments in excess of 1+2 ~Norris & Ortega, 2000!+
More generally still, the same meta-analysis demonstrated average effect sizes
in excess of 1+0 for 69 different explicit instructional treatments, whether they
involved focus on form or more traditional focus on forms+ It is true that
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explicit instruction evidences greater effect on outcome measures that are
themselves more explicit and metalinguistic in content ~Norris & Ortega!, but
form-focused instruction results in a medium-sized effect on free constructed
production measures too ~Norris & Ortega!, with further studies reviewed by
R+ Ellis ~2002! confirming this route of influence of explicit knowledge on
implicit learning+We need more studies to look at the effects of explicit instruc-
tion using outcome measures that particularly focus on different aspects of
implicit knowledge and processing ~Doughty, 2004!, but the weight of the evi-
dence to date is in favor of significant interface by the means of attention
being focused on relevant form-meaning connections in the limelight of con-
scious processing+
Perseveration: The Magnetism of L1 Perceptual Learning
Transfer and L1 entrenchment impede L2 implicit perceptual learning as well+
In general, a sound difference that crosses the boundary between phonemes
in a language is more discriminable to speakers of that language than to speak-
ers of a language in which the sound difference does not cross a phonemic
boundary ~Repp & Liberman, 1987!+ Whether such categorical perception
effects are found at particular physical boundaries depends on the listener’s
L1; these phenomena result from perceptual learning ~Lively, Pisoni, & Gold-
inger, 1994!+ The initial state of the neural stuff involved in language process-
ing is one of plasticity, whereby structures emerge from experience as the
optimal representational systems for the particular L1 to which they are
exposed+ Infants between 1 and 4 months of age can perceive the phoneme
contrasts of every possible language, but by the end of their first year, they
can only distinguish the contrasts of their own ~Werker & Lalonde, 1988;Werker
& Tees, 1984!+ In contrast to the newborn infant, the starting disposition of
the neural stuff for SLA is already tuned to the L1 and is set in its ways+ What
might be examples of two separate phonemic categories ~0r0 and 0l0! for an
L1 English language speaker are all of the same phonemic category for an L1
Japanese speaker+ Furthermore, in adulthood, the Japanese native cannot but
perceive 0r0 and 0l0 as one and the same+ The same form category is acti-
vated on each hearing and incremented in strength as a result+ Whatever the
various functional interpretations or categorizations of these assorted hear-
ings, their link to this category is strengthened with every occurrence, rightly
or wrongly+ The phonetic prototypes of one’s L1 act like perceptual magnets,
or attractors, distorting the perception of items in their vicinity to make them
seem more similar to the prototype ~Iverson et al+, 2003; Kuhl & Iverson, 1995!+
Under normal L1 circumstances, usage optimally tunes the language system
to the input+ A sad irony for an L2 speaker under such circumstances of trans-
fer is that more input simply compounds their error; they dig themselves ever
deeper into the hole begun and subsequently entrenched by their L1+
326 Nick C. Ellis
Exaggerated Stimuli and Noticing, Errorless Learning,
and Adaptive Training
The pedagogical innovations that have been brought to bear to encourage learn-
ers to overcome such negative transfer involve providing the phonemes in nat-
ural words, giving listeners words spoken by many different speakers, giving
immediate feedback as to the correct word, and particularly the use of error-
less learning techniques where discriminations start easy and become progres-
sively more difficult+ The use of exaggerated stimuli and adaptive training
~McClelland, Fiez, & McCandliss, 2002!, like errorless learning techniques more
generally, ensures that subsequent responding correctly differentiates the new
contrast rather than leading the learner to dig deeper and compound the old
confusion ~Baddeley, 1992; Baddeley & Wilson, 1994; Evans et al+, 2000!+ Con-
sciousness is needed to change behavior+ Contrastive pairs such as “rock” ver-
sus “lock” are made more exaggerated by extending their outer limits beyond
the normal range until L2 learners can consciously perceive the difference+ They
start by noticing these discernible poles, and then—as repeated occurrences
are correctly identified—the discrimination is made more difficult+ The use of
such exaggerated stimuli and adaptive training leads to rapid learning,whereas
the use of difficult stimuli with no adaptive modification produced little or no
benefit ~McCandliss, Fiez, Protopapas, Conway, & McClelland, 2002; McClel-
land, 2001!+ If the distinction is not brought into the limelight of conscious-
ness, our zombie agents are beyond our command; they continue automatically
processing the stimuli in the same old L1 way+ Automatization is the acme of
L1 learning+ At this point, the implicit language system has become so opti-
mally tuned that it quickly, autonomously, and ballistically provides the appro-
priate interpretation of a stimulus while conscious thought is occupied
elsewhere+ However, if that same form occurs in the L2 but cues something else,
then this automatization is the bane of SLA+ There is no way that implicit learn-
ing mechanisms can cope with a new interpretation, as they are automatized to
do differently+7 The only hope for change lies in the resources of consciousness+
The instructional techniques mentioned in Section 3 all illustrate the gen-
eral principle of explicit learning in SLA: Changing the cues that learners focus
on in their language processing changes what their implicit learning systems
tune+ Krashen’s ~1985! noninterface input hypothesis focused on implicit learn-
ing to the exclusion of all else ~Krashen, 1994!+ VanPatten’s ~1996! weak-interface
input processing hypothesis focused exclusively on this mechanism of inter-
face ~DeKeyser, Salaberry, Robinson, & Harrington, 2002; VanPatten, 2002!+
4. WHEN YOU TRY TO SAY SOMETHING
BUT DON’T KNOW HOW
If you do not already know how to say something, then you bring to mind
whatever explicit knowledge that you can that is relevant to the problem+ This
section considers various conscious processes of construction+ Explicit mem-
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ories are used as scaffolding in the building of linguistic constructions in work-
ing memory+ Formulas that express related meanings can be used in processes
of construction involving analogical reasoning and conceptual blending in work-
ing memory+ Drilled patterns, conjugations and declensions, mnemonics, and
declarative statements of pedagogical grammar can all contribute in the con-
scious construction of a desired utterance+ The result can then be tested by
saying it to yourself, and this rehearsal might remind you of another memo-
rized utterance or metalinguistic fact that relates to yet another aspect of the
desired construction+ In these various ways, explicit memories and declara-
tive knowledge can partake in utterance-building and monitoring+ Both the
processes and the result of this explicit construction process themselves feed
into implicit learning; skill acquisition theory describes how the construction
steps can become proceduralized, the resultant construction can itself be mem-
orized as a formula, and its utterance then and thenceforth entrenches its
memory and integrates its components, chunking and binding its parts in the
ways detailed in Section 3+
Alternatively, if your output is flawed, a helpful NS might provide you with
focused feedback by way of a recast that illustrates a more appropriate form
of expression+ “Notice this,” say our language tutors in their words and
their actions, and a new wave of explicit analysis is initiated+ Recasts can
present learners with psycholinguistic data that are optimized for acquisition
because—in the contrast between their own erroneous utterance and the
recast—they highlight the relevant element of form at the same time as the
desired meaning-to-be-expressed is still active, and the language learner is again
engaged in the processes of focused input analysis described in Section 3+ As
we will see in Section 5, the longer the delay between a cue and its outcome,
the less likely their association is to be learned and the more working mem-
ory is required for successful acquisition+
Another scope for explicit learning involves explicit memories as objects of
scrutiny for later analysis+ Formulas, originally explicitly learned as whole con-
structions, can be differentiated at a later stage, when the learner has also
acquired some of the relevant component building blocks, only then realizing
that these wholes might indeed be dissected into their component parts+ Con-
scious phonological rehearsal of an utterance can also provide a data source
that evidences noncontiguous associations, discontinuous dependencies that—
although out of the scope of implicit learning—can nevertheless be conjoined+
Equally, memorized expressions might serve as fodder for hypothesis forma-
tion—for example, by providing negative evidence that can constrain hypoth-
esis space and reign in overly general grammars+ This range of mechanisms,
each briefly reviewed subsequently, supports an output hypothesis as well+
Creative Construction in Working Memory
The Conscious Use of Exemplars as Analogies. Let us assess your explicit
ability to construct a novel utterance in Welsh+ Your task is to fill in the miss-
ing cell in Table 1+
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I will warrant that you can do it+ You can abstract the slot and frame pat-
tern for possession, and then slot in the appropriate Welsh noun—no wor-
ries+ And is the result fully grammatical—did you get the soft mutation too? If
so, you managed it using generative processes of schematization and analogy+
You took some known formulaic phrases, aligned them to elucidate the schema,
noted the relational structure between the bare noun and its soft-mutated form,
and applied that change as you built the construction—from formulas to cre-
ative construction+ The more the exemplars of a particular item-based schema
have in common, the more readily the schema can be implicitly acquired by
connectionist mechanisms+ The more abstract the schema, the more the
learner must have an explicit understanding of the functional interrelation-
ships between the structures being aligned because there is little or no cor-
respondence in surface form, and more conscious processes of analogical
reasoning are involved+8 Again, the more novelty we encounter, the more con-
scious involvement is needed for successful learning and problem-solving
~Baars, 1997a!+ The essence of analogy is a focus on relations: Consider the
solar system as a model of the atom whereby the mapping identity is in terms
of parallel roles in relations rather than the objects themselves+ Cognitive sci-
ence is developing sophisticated theories of analogical reasoning ~Gentner &
Markman, 1997; Gentner & Medina, 1998; Hofstadter & Group, 1996; Hof-
stadter & Mitchell, 1994!+ Sophisticated computational accounts of the role of
analogy in linguistic construction are now being developed ~Skousen, 1995;
Skousen, Lonsdale, & Parkison, 2003!+ Language acquisition researchers are
also realizing learners’ exploitation of analogical reasoning and the explana-
tory viability of this process as a productive learning mechanism once func-
tion as well as form are taken into account ~Goldberg, 1999; Langacker, 2000;
Tomasello, 2003; Verhagen, 2002!+
Thus, explicit memories of utterances can be used as scaffolding in the
building of novel linguistic constructions that use processes of analogical rea-
soning and conceptual blending, operations that involve conscious process-
ing and the resources of working memory+ The more explicit the reasoning,
the more likely it is to become productive and generalizable: Learners who
observe their own thinking and are encouraged to think through and to give
an account of why they consider one answer to be better or worse than another
for a particular analogy problem learn better, make more accurate self-
assessments of their understanding, and use analogies more economically while
solving problems ~Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; VanLehn, Jones,
& Chi, 1992!+
Table 1. Some Welsh utterances and their English equivalents
English phrase Welsh phrase English noun Welsh noun
I have a headache Mae gen i gur pen Headache Cur pen
I have a car Mae gen i gar Car Car
I have a cat ? Cat Cath
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The Conscious Use of Drills, Mnemonics, Metalinguistic Rules, and Other
Declarative Knowledge. The learner’s instructional regime and their pre-
ferred style of learning—or both—might well have motivated their memoriza-
tion of drills, conjugations, declensions, mnemonics for grammatical patterns,
or other metalinguistic pedagogical guides+ Learners can utilize this explicit
metalinguistic knowledge at points of dysfluency—when they do not yet have
the implicit fluent knowledge, when they cannot access a low-frequency form,
or when ~as described in the next section! they monitor their own erroneous
output+ Then, they fall back on these compensatory devices to provide addi-
tional support for their explicit decoding or construction in working memory
~Poulisse, 1990; Poulisse, Bongaerts, & Kellerman, 1984!+ Traditional Latin
classes provide the paradigm case for explicit paradigm use+ I can still intro-
spect upon my construction processes as a schoolboy: “He loves the table” r
mensa mensae mensae mensam . . . amo amas amat r amat mensam+ Simple
reaction time recording would have evidenced longer latencies for produc-
tions that demanded rote access from further down the paradigms+ And do
these labored constructions produce anything that can influence the implicit
system? As we will see, skill-building mechanisms of proceduralization, chunk-
ing, and the development of automaticity suggest that they might, although
my continued use of the paradigm in this example demonstrates that such
interface is by no means necessary+
Even if the learner does not have the necessary resources to allow success-
ful utterance-building, their pushed output can bring to their attention the
fact that they need to know something else before they can say what they
want to say+ They “notice the gap” and might consequently pay attention to
these forms in subsequent input, with accompanying memorization, hypoth-
esis formation and testing, or tapping of metalinguistic or other pedagogical
sources ~Swain & Lapkin, 1995!+9
Monitoring
Learners can monitor their own output+ During production, their utterance
can remind them of various forms of other relevant knowledge+ Krashen ~1982!
proposed a limited role for explicit knowledge in L2 as a monitor, or editor,
that comes into play after the utterance is initiated and produced by the
acquired system and that can then be used to make changes to the form of
the utterance if it seems erroneous+ The familiar “i before e except after c
when it’s an ee sound” comes to mind on writing or planning to write *recieve+
This use of metalinguistic knowledge to counter erroneous implicit habits is
what Baars ~1997a! referred to more generally as the prioritizing and access
control function of consciousness+ He gave the example of public health cam-
paigns to persuade smokers that the act of lighting a cigarette is life-threatening
over the long term, thus increasing their conscious involvement with smok-
ing, intending thereby to create more opportunities for change in a largely
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automatic habit+ By consciously relating some event to higher-level goals, we
can help to make it conscious more often and thereby increase the chances
of successful adaptation+ Health psychology and SLA share the goal of behav-
ioral change—the challenge of making explicit knowledge impact on implicit
habits+ They share similar difficulties, too, in that entrenched behaviors can
be very resistant to change+
It is worth emphasizing again that—of themselves—metalinguistic descrip-
tions do not impact implicit language knowledge+ They are of a different stuff,
and they are stored in different parts of the brain ~Krashen, 1985; Paradis,
1994!+ However, metalinguistic descriptions and other explicit knowledge that
come to consciousness at the appropriate moment to influence the process-
ing of a language form and its corresponding interpretation do impact lan-
guage knowledge+ The issues of transfer-appropriate processing ~Lockhart,
2002; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977; Roediger, 2000!, context-dependent
memory ~Baddeley, 1997!, and the maintenance and generalization of behav-
ior modifications ~Kazdin, 2000! apply to all aspects of access to the contents
of prior explicit language instruction ~Segalowitz & Lightbown, 1999!+
Learners’ own productions can also remind them of stored exemplars of
correct productions from native speakers, allowing any deviations from these
norms to be identified, which is why *recieve does not quite look right in the
first place+ The result can be an immediate correction, with the revision itself
then entering into the implicit learning process, and the learner noticing that
his or her production of this form tends to go astray, with prospective tag-
ging for caution and attentive processing of this feature next time+ Levelt ~1983,
1989! described his perceptual loop theory of the mechanisms by which inspec-
tion and monitoring of prearticulatory output allows the interception of erro-
neous L1 production+ Research on L2 self-repairs suggests that mechanisms
of L1 and L2 monitoring and self-repair behavior are broadly similar, with anal-
ogous patterns of distribution, detection, and self-repair in L1 and L2 ~Poul-
isse, 1999!+ Nevertheless, a lack of automaticity in L2 can affect the amount of
attention available for L2 error detection; a relative lack of L2 exposure entails
that there are fewer relevant correct exemplars available in memory and that
these come less readily and less accurately to mind+ Furthermore, depending
on the context and stage of learning, a L2 learner might have greater or lesser
quality and quantity of explicit declarative metalinguistic knowledge to bring
to bear compared to a native speaker+ Kormos ~1999, 2000!, and Doughty ~2001!
described these processes of monitoring and self-correction in L2+
Feedback, Recasts, and Negative Evidence
In the same way that communication partners help our receptive learning of
“gavagous” new constructions, so they can scaffold our productive enter-
prises as well+ If the output is flawed, a helpful NS will provide focused feed-
back by way of recasts that illustrate more appropriate forms of expression+
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A recast presents learners with psycholinguistic data that are fertile and ready
for acquisition because—in the contrast between the learners’ own errone-
ous utterance and the recast—it highlights the relevant element of the form
at the same time that the desired meaning-to-be-expressed is still active
~Doughty, 2001; Doughty & Williams, 1998; Tomasello & Herron, 1988, 1989!+
Interaction in which participants’ attention is focused on resolving a commu-
nication problem and the consequent negotiation of form and meaning “con-
nects input, internal learner capacities, particularly selective attention, and
output in productive ways” ~Long, 1996!+ “Notice this,” say our language tutors
in their words and their actions, and thus a new wave of explicit analysis is
initiated, with consequent benefits from both NS-NNS and NNS-NNS oral dis-
cussions ~Gass, 1997; Gass & Varonis, 1994; Long, 1996!+
In these ways, SLA can be freed from the bounds of L1-induced selective
attention by some means of form-focus that is socially provided ~Tarone, 1997!
and that recruits the learner’s explicit processing+ This dialectic—the learner
in a conscious tension between the conflicting forces of their current interlan-
guage productions and the evidence of feedback ~either linguistic, pragmatic,
or metalinguistic!—is a means of socially scaffolded development+ Sometimes
recasts are effective, sometimes not+ They provide one source of bias in a
dynamic system+ Nothing is guaranteed: Native speakers often do not provide
recasts unless there is a serious communication problem, and recasts are not
necessarily attended to ~Lyster, 1998; Lyster & Ranta, 1997; Panova & Lyster,
2002!+ However, on occasion, a recast can provide that “slightest nudge” ~Scott
Kelso, 2002! that puts the dynamic system into a new coordinated state+ As
Heraclitus characterized creativity: “All things come into being through oppo-
sition, and all are in flux like a river”—the interface is both dynamic and dia-
lectic ~N+ Ellis, 2004; Scott Kelso, 1997!+
Integration from Practice: Schematization, Proceduralization,
Chunking, and Automaticity
Thus, by various means, the learner can use explicit knowledge to consciously
construct an utterance in working memory+ “Practice makes perfect” applies
here as it does with other skills+ Sharwood Smith’s ~1978, 1981! interactive
theory of explicit and implicit knowledge proposed that some aspects of lan-
guage performance can be planned from the start entirely on the basis of
explicit knowledge and that sufficient repetition of these preplanned utter-
ances results in fluency by means of this productive practice, with the utter-
ances themselves providing feedback as input to implicit knowledge+ Having
consciously constructed an utterance using various steps and sources of infor-
mation, the learner can, as a result, do it a little more easily and a little more
quickly next time+ After enough practice, they can eventually do it automati-
cally+ Thus, conscious processing results in the training of unconscious, auto-
matic, zombie sensori-motor agents ~Koch, 2004, chapter 14!+
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Note that there are four different effects of practice being discussed here+
The first effect is improved access: We get better at retrieving explicit declar-
ative memories as a result of practice+ Schematization and script-building is
the second result of practice: We link together behaviors that we repeat in
the same sequence+ These two effects allow the learner to go through the same
stages of explicit construction in the same sequence a little more skillfully,
calling and executing the different procedures a little faster as a result of prac-
tice, in the same way that a novice cook gets more fluent at making a bécha-
mel sauce from a recipe; the stages are the same, but the ingredients are found
more readily, and the progression through the steps is more routine+ Execut-
ing different conscious procedures a little faster as a result of practice is not
an automatization of explicit knowledge—it is only speeded-up processing+
Thus, fluency is not necessarily evidence of implicit competence because flu-
ency might reflect speeded-up controlled processes ~Paradis, 2004, pp+ 40,
50–53!+ The third effect is chunking: Adjacent perceptual and behavioral
sequences become more strongly bound the more we process them+ The con-
structed message itself will get chunked together, implicit learning binding
the utterance into an entrenched formula, a whole product that can be looked
up from memory the next time it is required+ Bybee and Hopper ~2001! and
N+ Ellis ~1996, 2002a! described the ways that chunking and sequence repeti-
tion lead to the consolidation of memorized whole utterances+ Finally, autom-
atization is a result of practice: With sufficient implicit practice, the relevant
production is executed swiftly and without reflection, in the way that an expert
chef can make a sauce without thinking about it while doing many other things
at the same time+ Production is automatized when it is no longer under explicit
control, when it occurs ballistically, and when it can be performed while think-
ing of something else+ Segalowitz and Segalowitz ~1993! provided additional
temporal criteria that differentiate speeded from automatized behavior+
Anderson’s ~1983, 1992, 1996! ACT model described the move from declar-
ative to procedural knowledge as three broad stages: a cognitive stage, where
a declarative description of the procedure is learned; an associative stage,
where the learner works on productions for performing the process; and an
autonomous stage, where execution of the skill becomes rapid and auto-
matic+ McLaughlin ~1987! described processes of L2 automatization, from the
novice’s slow and halting production by means of attentive control of con-
struction in working memory to fluent automatic processing with the relevant
programs and routines being executed swiftly and without reflection+ Schmidt
~1992! described Logan’s ~1988! instance theory of automatization and how it
relates to SLA, and Towell and Hawkins ~1994!, Skehan ~1998!, Segalowitz and
Segalowitz ~1993!, and DeKeyser ~2001! all provided recent reviews of L2
automatization+
So how do you say “I have a cat?” in Welsh again? Every permutation of
proceduralization, automatization, and memorization is possible, as it is in
the math classroom ~3 3 41: 3++ 1 3++ 1 3++ 1 3++ 5 12+ Next time 3 3 42: 3 1 3 1
3 1 3 5 12, with faster counting and realization of the stages+ Next time 3 3
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43 5 12!, so it is in Latin grammar-translation ~“He loves the table1:” mensa
mensae mensae mensam, amo amas amat: amat mensam+ “He loves the table2:”
mensa mensae mensae mensam, amat: amat mensam+ “He loves the table3:”
amat mensam + + + “He loves the table1004:” amat mensam!+ You will experience
evidence of these different types of learning increment if you try to express
your having a tabby to a Taffy yet one more time now+
Differentiation and Restructuring
Another scope for explicit learning involves explicit memories as objects of
scrutiny for later analysis+ Formulas are initially learned as whole construc-
tions+ Only later, when the learner has also acquired some of the relevant com-
ponent building blocks, might the learner realize that these wholes might
indeed be dissected into their component parts+ Language acquisition does
not just rely on integration; it is repeated cycles of integration and differenti-
ation leading to a restructuring of knowledge ~Karmiloff-Smith, 1979, 1992;
McLaughlin, 1990!+ Much of this analysis and restructuring comes from the
tallying and distributional analysis of implicit learning+ However, other realiza-
tions come first from explicit analysis+
Explicit Analysis of Language Rehearsed in Phonological
Short-Term Memory
Implicit learning is good for chunking—for the acquisition of local serial asso-
ciations between chunks of the input and for the realization of adjacent units
in parsing+ It is good for the sort of learning underlying the Hebb effect
~N+ Ellis, 2002a; Hebb, 1961!+ However, in artificial grammar learning experi-
ments, associations that are more complex than adjacency or immediate suc-
cession require more conscious explicit learning and hypothesis testing before
they can be acquired+ The experiments of Ellis, Lee, and Reber ~1999! pro-
vided evidence that this is the case for some long-distance discontinuous depen-
dencies in language acquisition: In these experiments, the ability to maintain
the surface evidence of these associations in working memory by means of
rehearsal in the phonological loop provided the window on language form,
which allowed scrutiny of these discontinuous dependencies+ Cohen, Ivry,
and Keele ~1990! and Curran and Keele ~1993! showed that although unique
sequences can be acquired implicitly in serial learning experiments, ambigu-
ous sequences require more attentional forms of learning+ Likewise, Gomez
~1997! demonstrated that learning can occur without awareness in cases of
lesser complexity such as learning first-order dependencies in artificial lan-
guages+ However, more complex learning, such as that involved in second-
order dependencies or in transfer to stimuli with the same underlying syntax
but new surface features, involves explicit learning that uses the attentional
resources and slave systems of working memory+
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Working Memory and Awareness for Analysis
Beyond the Here-and-Now
This notion that implicit learning is limited to the learning of associations
involving spatially and temporally contiguous representations points to the
“here-and-nowness” of implicit learning+ The concentration necessary for the
analysis of associations across longer temporal durations in the face of dis-
traction requires the resources of working memory+ Mice can learn to associ-
ate a tone with an immediate shock and, equally, with a delayed one that
follows a while ~18 seconds! afterward+ However, when bright lights are flashed
at random in the gloomy cage during the tone-shock pairing phase, condition-
ing to the delayed shock is much weaker, as if the flashes prevent the mice
from attending to the relationship between the tone and the shock+ Distrac-
tion does not, however, affect the strength of the conditioning when the shock
immediately follows the tone, suggesting that contiguous associations require
less working memory than do discontinuous ones ~Han et al+, 2003!+
Humans show a similar involvement of attention and working memory in
associative learning across time and distraction, and awareness plays a part
here as well: Clark and Squire ~1998! tested participants in conditioning exper-
iments where one sound—say a pure 2-Hz tone ~the conditioned stimulus!—
signaled a puff of air into their eye, whereas another sound ~e+g+, a hissing
noise! was never followed by this aversive unconditioned stimulus+ When the
air puff followed the conditioned stimulus immediately, participants showed
eye blink conditioning ~blinking before unconditioned stimulus delivery!
whether or not they were consciously aware of the relationships and could
describe them+ They showed this implicit learning even in the face of distrac-
tion in dual-task experiments, where they had to track rapidly appearing num-
bers or monitor a movie at the same time+ However, if the unconditioned
stimulus followed the conditioned stimulus after a short ~1 second! delay, the
distracting task interfered with learning+ Those participants who showed con-
ditioning could describe the relationships between the two sounds and the
unconditioned stimulus ~e+g+, “The tone was followed by the air puff but the
hiss was not+”!, but those who did not condition could not, suggesting that if
discontinuous associations are to be learned over time, learners need the
resources of working memory to attend to the two events, and they need to
be aware of the relation between them+ Working memory allows temporally
discrete events to be brought together into the spotlight, united in conscious-
ness, and consolidated into an explicit memory+
Overly General Grammars and Preemption
Implicit learning mechanisms and their connectionist simulations abstract reg-
ularities from exemplars and are able to apply the default pattern to novel
items and are thus able to successfully pass wug tests+ However,many domains
of language are only quasi-regular; there are exceptions to the default pat-
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terns+ Much of the connectionist work on this issue has been done in the quasi-
regular domain of past-tense morphology, where it has been shown that the
same system can memorize high-frequency irregular items alongside the many
exemplars of like-behaved exemplars, whose conspiracy allows the emer-
gence of defaults+ Overapplication of the default pattern is constrained by com-
petition ~MacWhinney, 1987b!, driven by processes of conspiracy ~high type
frequency patterns generalize!, entrenchment ~high token frequency, low type
frequency patterns are less likely to generalize to novel constructions!, and
preemption ~if the learner hears an item in a construction that serves the same
communicative function as a possible default generalization, the heard con-
struction preempts the generalization; Bybee & Hopper, 2001; MacWhinney,
Leinbach, Taraban, & McDonald, 1989!+ Preemption occurs in connectionist
models, provided that the nonconventional form is of sufficiently high fre-
quency ~Brooks, Tomasello, Lewis, & Dodson, 1999; MacWhinney & Leinbach,
1991!+ In these circumstances of entrenchment of the nonconventional form,
preemption can be implicit+
However, sometimes there has been plenty of prior evidence that a general-
ization applies, whereas in fact it does not ~Pinker, 1989!+ How is such a para-
dox possible? Sometimes it arises in situations of language transfer+When there
is an L1-L2 contrast, the learner might need direct explicit negative feedback
to notice that the input only provides evidence about the nonapplication of a
rule+ Consider adverb placement in French and English+ An adverb in English
cannot intervene between a verb and its direct object, as is possible in French+
White ~1991! demonstrated that Francophone learners assume that the L1 pos-
sibilities of adverb placement generalize to English: Because Subject ~S! Adverb
~A! Verb ~V! Object ~O! and SVOA orders are possible in both languages, all of
the learners she tested overgeneralized and assumed SVAO ~“*Tom drinks often
coffee”! to be a possible English word order+ Over a period of 5 weeks of typi-
cal classroom instruction, an instruction group that received explicit negative
feedback came to recognize the unacceptability of the SVAO order in English,
whereas a control group did not+
If the natural input only provides negative evidence about the nonappli-
cation of a regularity that has had much support in the L1, then explicit
negative feedback from the teacher might be required to constrain such over-
generalization+ It is likely that this explicit knowledge acts via the mecha-
nisms of monitoring described previously+ By slowly increasing the frequency
of correct productions over incorrect ones, the cue strengths of the implicit
system can be retuned to the L2+ Nevertheless, for the reasons described pre-
viously with regard to salience, insignificance, and perseveration, such progress
can be very slow+
Output Processing and Its Effectiveness
The comprehensible output hypothesis ~Swain, 1985, 1993, 1995, 1998! pro-
posed that in addition to comprehensible input, comprehensible output
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contributes to L2 acquisition because learners make their output more com-
prehensible if obliged to do so by the demands of communication ~Lyster, 1998;
Panova & Lyster, 2002!+ The present analysis supports such proposals in that,
as learners try to produce comprehensible output, the various means of con-
struction described in Section 4 potentially come into play in the develop-
ment of accuracy and fluency ~De Bot, 1996; Izumi, 2003!+
The balance of experimental findings supports the effectiveness for SLA of
encouraging learners to produce output+ Norris and Ortega ~2000! summa-
rized the results of six studies from before 1999 ~including DeKeyser & Sokal-
ski, 1996, and Salaberry, 1997! that involved explicit focus on forms followed
by output practice and that demonstrated a substantial average effect size of
1+39+ Izumi, Bigelow, Fujiwara, and Fearnow ~1999! showed that opportunities
for reconstruction in a pushed output task encouraged the noticing of task-
relevant aspects of linguistic form and there was evidence of enhanced rule-
learning in relation to those forms+ DeKeyser et al+ ~2002! pulled together the
results of more recent studies ~Allen, 2000; Benati, 2001; Cheng, 2002; Collen-
tine, 1998; Farley, 2001!, all of which substantiated that output-based treat-
ments promoted learners to significant improvement on uses of the Spanish
subjunctive, acquisition of Spanish copulas, interpretation and production of
the Italian future tense, and acquisition of the French causative+ Keck, Iberri-
Shea, Tracy, and Wa-Mbaleka ~in press! reported a quantitative meta-analysis
of studies of the effects of interaction on acquisition+ Eight of the unique sam-
ple studies in this meta-analysis involved pushed output, where participants
were required to attempt production of target features, often because they
played the role of information-holders in jigsaw, information-gap, or narrative
tasks+ The effects of these treatments were compared with six other inter-
action studies that did not provide opportunities for pushed output+ Tasks
involving opportunities for pushed output ~d 5 1+05! produced larger effect
sizes than tasks without pushed output ~d 5 0+61! on immediate posttests+
Much more research is needed to get at the individual components, but taken
together, these studies provide good reason to consider an interface whereby
explicit knowledge affects implicit learning during output too+
5. WORKING MEMORY IN LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
Like any other biological adaptation, consciousness is functional+ However,
the power of consciousness is exponential in that its major functions provide
flexible adaptations to novel situations ~Baars, 1988, chapter 10!+ Baars out-
lined nine separate such functions of consciousness, all of which involve work-
ing memory as the theater of consciousness+ Working memory is like 221b
Baker Street: It is the home of explicit deduction, hypothesis formation, ana-
logical reasoning, prioritization, control, and decision-making+ It is where we
develop, apply, and hone our metalinguistic insights into an L2+Working mem-
ory is the system that concentrates across time, controlling attention in the
face of distraction, as illustrated in the experiments by Clark and Squire ~1998!
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and Han et al+ ~2003! described previously+ It is the supervisory system that
schedules cognitive processing, manipulating temporary memory representa-
tions that become relevant during the work of everyday cognition+ If I ask you
what 397 3 27 is, you do not look up the answer from long-term memory, you
work it out+ If I ask you the directions from your office to the nearest copy
shop, you again manipulate a mental map to work out the turns and describe
the route+ When I first asked you to work out the Welsh utterance for “I have
a cat,” you had to access and manipulate a number of different types of tem-
porary memory representation+ Once you have solved these problems, the
representations of the interim solutions that were temporarily activated dur-
ing processing rapidly fade from short-term memory+ Two different research
teams to be described in this section—one Canadian ~Daneman, Just, Carpen-
ter, and colleagues! and the other British ~Baddeley, Hitch, Gathercole, and
contemporaries!—spawned what is now a thriving research effort into the
nature of human working memory+ Miyake and Shah ~1999! provided a com-
prehensive comparison of current alternative accounts+
The Canadian working memory model ~Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Dane-
man & Case, 1981; Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Just & Carpenter, 1992! empha-
sizes the trade-off between storage and processing, as is evidenced by its
operationalization, which measures working memory capacity as sentence span,
where sentences have to be comprehended and evaluated for meaning while
a verbal storage load ~the last word of each sentence! steadily increases in
magnitude+ People differ in their working memory capacity so defined+ Im-
portantly, these individual differences relate to language learning aptitude:
People with better sentence span are better language learners, both in L1
~Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Case, 1981; Daneman & Green, 1986;
Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999! and in
L2 ~Harrington & Sawyer, 1992!+ Sawyer and Ranta ~2001!, Mackey, Philp, Egi,
Fujii, and Tatsumi ~2002!, and Robinson ~2003! reviewed the L2 work+ The fact
that individual differences in this measure of attentional processing predict
individual differences in SLA also lends support to theories of the role of con-
scious processing and explicit learning in SLA+
The British working memory model ~Baars & Franklin, 2003; Baddeley, 1986;
Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno, 1998; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gathercole &
Baddeley, 1993! comprises a supervisory attentional system, two temporary
slave memories ~the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketch pad!, and—
more recently—a third cross-modal store, the episodic buffer, which holds epi-
sodic memories retrieved from long-term memory for scrutiny ~Baddeley, 2000,
2002!+ There are several reviews of the role of British working memory model
in L1 acquisition ~Baddeley et al+, 1998; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993! and L2
acquisition ~N+ Ellis, 1996, 2001; Ellis & Sinclair, 1996!+ This research has cen-
tered on the role of the phonological loop in the acquisition of vocabulary
and formulaic utterances, the ways in which phonological long-term memory
supports short-term rehearsal by Hebbian chunking processes, and how
rehearsal in the phonological loop provides a window on language by allow-
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ing its attended scrutiny and analysis+ Phonological loop capacity, as mea-
sured by short-term memory span for verbal material such as nonwords, is a
good predictor of L2 learning ability ~Ellis & Sinclair; Williams & Lovatt, 2003!+
To date, there has been too little work directly comparing these trans-
Atlantic models of working memory and their components as predictors of
different aspects of SLA+ To my knowledge, there is the work of Miyake, Car-
penter, and Just ~1994!, which assessed the role of word, digit, and sentence
span in L2 cue assignment in sentence comprehension,Williams ~1999!, which
compared nonword span and sentence span as predictors of artificial lan-
guage grammatical induction, Juffs ~2003!, which assessed their role in pars-
ing, and Mackey et al+ ~2002!, which investigated their role in noticing and
uptake from recasts+ There is too little to go on as yet+ Following the propos-
als in Sections 3 and 4, we might expect the different components of working
memory to be differentially involved in implicit and explicit language learn-
ing+ Phonological short-term memory should contribute to the memory of
form—both implicit and explicit—and to the ability to hold phonological feed-
back in the form of recasts+ Explicit declarative memory—as a blueprint for
explicit construction—and its ready access in the episodic buffer should affect
ability in conscious creative construction for output and in monitoring+ The
supervisory attentional system, as tapped more in Canadian working memory
sentence span tasks, should be more associated with explicit learning and the
analysis of the language that is temporarily represented in the phonological
loop or episodic buffer as well as in consciously created construction+ This
analysis already suggests that there are overlapping involvements of the dif-
ferent components in different tasks+ Given this complexity, the danger of cir-
cularity in interpretation and operationalization of the different components
~Canadian working memory tasks always involve a lot of language processing,
so ability on language processing tasks predicts language processing ability!,
and the interactions of explicit and implicit language learning in dynamic inter-
face as analyzed in this review, it is clear that the separations of involvement
of the Canadian and British working memory models and their components in
different aspects of language learning will not be clear-cut+ Indeed, these sys-
tems work together: Attention might well be involved in noticing, but a suit-
able declarative metalinguistic summary in the episodic buffer can focus
attention ready for noticing, and all this is to naught if the temporary repre-
sentation of language form in the phonological loop is poorly or noisily spec-
ified+ Equally, holding a recent utterance in the window provided by the
phonological loop provides little explicit learning if there is no attentional
analysis+10
6. BALANCED LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES
The facts ~a! that implicit and explicit language learning are different, ~b! that
they promote different aspects of language proficiency, and ~c! that atten-
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tional focus in input processing and output processing provide different oppor-
tunities for the interface of explicit and implicit knowledge, when taken
together, have simple but profound consequences for language learning and
instruction—namely, as Nation ~2001! encapsulated for vocabulary learning,
there must be a balanced learning curriculum that provides opportunities for
meaning focused input, meaning-focused output, form-focused learning, and
fluency development+
7. TWO DISSOCIATIONS AND A UNION: CONSCIOUS AND
UNCONSCIOUS LEARNING, WORKING MEMORY,
AND CONNECTIONISM
In this paper, I have distinguished between the mechanisms of conscious and
unconscious learning+ I have emphasized the importance of attention and
consciousness in the former and of connectionist learning in the latter+ In
synopsis—so oversimplified that I fear it will come back to haunt me—the
sequential motives of learning are novice 1 externally scaffolded attention r
internally motivated attention r explicit learning r explicit memory r implicit
learning r implicit memory, automatization, and abstraction 5 expert+ We
carve development into broad stages, and complex systems into rough and
ready departmental separations, just so that we can pin them down and talk
about them+ However, the wonder of complex systems—none more wonderful
or more complex than the human mind—is their wholeness+ The world in which
we live becomes represented in our minds+ Old brain and new brain integrate
into one functional whole ~Luria, 1973!+ Our significant others, peers, and guides
in this world become internalized in our motivations and attentions ~Toma-
sello, 1999; Vygotsky, 1980!+ The memes of our culture, transmitted through
language, infect our conscious and unconscious selves ~Dawkins, 1976; Den-
nett, 1992!+ Controlled processing tunes our zombie agents+ The echoes of our
conscious experience live on in our unconscious+ Emergence, dynamism, and
synergy abound ~Elman et al+, 1996; Holland, 1998; Larsen-Freeman, 1997;
MacWhinney, 2001b; Scott Kelso, 1997!+
So what? Well, I have maintained the functional and anatomical separations
of systems of conscious attended processing and systems of implicit process-
ing+ This is usual, as any cognitive psychology or neurobiology text will affirm+
However, these implicit and explicit systems are like the yin and the yang+ Con-
scious and unconscious processes are dynamically involved together in every
cognitive task and in every learning episode+ The input to our connectionist
implicit learning systems comes via unitized explicit representations forged
from prior attended processing+ The input to our slave systems in working
memory comes via the echoes and abstractions of our long-term memories;
we perceive the world through schematic lenses that represent our prior expe-
rience of the world+ What we attend to is determined by our prior experience+
Salience is as much a psychological as a physical property; many affordances
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are cultural, goal-driven, and emergent+ What is important is what is impor-
tant to us—it is not the things of the world that concern us, it is our thoughts
of those things+ Long-term attentional biases relevant to the learning of con-
structions emerge from experience+ Short-term attentional biases relevant to
the learning of constructions emerge from priming and context-setting from
metalinguistic knowledge+ There are long-term memory contributions to short-
term memory representations+ So, these aspects of working memory also result
from experience and they can be understood in connectionist terms, with atten-
tional biases emerging during learning and thus affecting the learning rates in
connectionist systems ~Kruschke, 2001; Nosofsky, 1987!, and linguistic process-
ing capacity emerging from network architecture and frequency and regular-
ity of experience, both functionally ~MacDonald & Christiansen, 2002! and
anatomically ~Faw, 2003!+ On the whole, the learning, representation, and pro-
cessing of language is part of the same dynamic network system+
NOTES
1+ The Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness was established in 1996 and held
its inaugural conference in 1997+
2+ In statistical terms, this is the problem of multicollinearity, as it affects multiple regression+
3+ If this does not do the job and you are still at a loss, a helpful interlocutor—if they judge that
your understanding is more important than a break in flow—will often next explain in detail, per-
haps providing an explicit definition+
4+ There is no better reasoned a case for the advantages of attended over unattended process-
ing for L2 learning than that of Schmidt ~2001!+ For the various reasons mentioned in Section 1 and
N+ Ellis ~2002a, 2002b!, I believe he seriously underestimated the contributions of implicit learning
in SLA, but nevertheless, I remain convinced of most of his arguments in favor of attended process-
ing+ Attention guides our SLA as it guides us through the world+ Guthrie ~1959! realized the moder-
ating power of attention, modifying his previous behaviorist learning theory to allow for selection,
in his words “What is noticed becomes the stimulus for what is done” ~p+ 186!+ Likewise, James
contrasted the traditional philosophical empiricist view of the person as “absolutely passive clay,
upon which ‘experience’ rains down,” with that moderated by attention: “My experience is what I
agree to attend to” ~1950, p+ 402!+ For James, attention is the mental action associated with choice
and free will: “each of us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what sort of universe
he shall appear to himself to inhabit” ~p+ 424, emphasis in original!+
5+ It is a common enough phenomenon: As 8-year-old Aspen observed, having fallen in love
with a litter of Jack Russell terriers a fortnight earlier, “Once you’ve noticed them, they seem to be
everywhere+” To which 10-year-old Gabe added, “Like those lizards in Malaysia, once you’d seen
one, they were all over the place+”
6+ This does not mean that repeated noticing might not be beneficial for consolidation, partic-
ularly in cases where the cue is nonsalient, the form is complicated, the meaning is subtle, the
contingency between the two is unreliable, or there is strong competition from L1 transfer+
7+ Automaticity—the involuntary nature of automatic actions—is a common cause of slips of
action+ Analysis of the errors leading to catastrophic accidents shows that many such fatal errors
involve a habitual intrusion, an inadvertent substitution of a highly automatic action for the correct
one ~Reason, 1984!+
8+ This is not to say that connectionist models cannot learn abstract relations—quite the con-
trary ~Dienes, Altmann, & Gao, 1999; Elman, 1998; French & Cleeremans, 2002!+ It is rather that anal-
ogies and broad abstractions, relational parallels that generalize to stimuli instantiated on quite
different stimulus dimensions from those of the training set, are more readily captured by the con-
scious mind+ In the language of Jean Piaget ~1975!, the more we must accommodate to new informa-
tion, the more we need to be consciously involved with it+
9+ Of course, “noticing the gap” is not of itself a solution+ It is just the beginning orientation, a
recognition that the problem needs to be consciously addressed+
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10+Williams and Lovatt ~2003! showed how the ability to hold material in the phonological loop
is a determinant of learners’ ability to learn the rules relating grammatical gender of nouns to the
determiners that accompanied them+ However, there were also statistically independent effects of
knowledge of other gender languages, suggesting that not only must the material be available for
scrutiny in working memory but there must also be prior knowledge that focuses attentional biases
to guide the analysis appropriately+
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